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Article
An ‘‘Ethical Moment’’
in Data Sharing
Catherine Heeney1
Abstract
This study draws on interviews with forty-nine members of a biomedical
research community in the UK that is involved in negotiating data sharing
and access. During an interview, an interviewee used the words ‘‘ethical
moment’’ to describe a confrontation between collaborators in relation to
data sharing. In this article, I use this as a lens for thinking about relations
between ‘‘the conceptual and the empirical’’ in a way that allows both
analyst and actor to challenge the status quo and consider other ethical
possibilities. Drawing on actor network theory (ANT), I approach ‘‘the
empirical’’ using the concepts of controversy and ontological uncertainty as
methodological tools to tackle the problem of ethics. I suggest that these
concepts also provide a bridge for understanding the ontological structure
of the virtual and the actual, as described in Deleuze’s Difference and
Repetition. While other science and technology studies scholars have sought
to draw on Deleuze, this article addresses the integration of ethics and
empirical research. It arises as a critical reaction to existing treatments of
this problem as found in empirical ethics, especially in the sociology of
bioethics, and indirectly in ANT texts.
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Introduction
Biobanks and repositories that enable data sharing for the purposes of
research have attracted social, ethical, and legal scholarship on governance,
privacy, and informed consent (Laurie 2002, 2011; Tutton and Corrigan
2004; Boulton and Parker 2007; Haddow et al. 2008; Gottweis and Peterson
2008; Lunshof et al. 2008; Mascalzoni, Hicks, and Pramstaller 2009; Hee-
ney et al. 2010). Sharing biomedical data presents actors with a shifting set
of relationships to data, collaborators, and data subjects (Hilgartner and
Brandt-Rauf 1994; Hackett 2005). In this article, I consider the task of
bringing together the empirical and the ethical in relation to questions of
data access and use. I argue that the empirical and the ethical do influence
each other, and my aim is to make a case for the equality of analysts and
actors in this process. I draw on forty-nine interviews with actors involved
in using or setting up genetic databases in England andWales between 2006
and 2009. I want to experiment with conceptual–empirical relationships
(Jenson 2014) using the actors’ category of the ‘‘ethical moment,’’ which
captures an event in which what is ethical comes into question. The ethical
moment at the same time embodies an ontological controversy that allows
both analyst and actor to consider ethical possibilities beyond practices and
abstract moral frameworks.
Actor network theory (ANT) has engaged with ethics, in the form of
care, for example, and appears broadly to take the stance that what is ethical
is what is done in practice (see Mol 2008; Singleton 1996). What follows is
a response to this stance. I consider the position of two fields that constitute
explicit existing approaches to the problem of bringing ethics and the
empirical together. These distinct approaches fall under the headings of
sociology of bioethics, which has clear overlaps with ANT (Hedgecoe
2004; Pickersgill 2012; Wainwright et al. 2006) and empirical bioethics
(Ives 2008; Parker 2007; Leget, Borry, and de Vries 2009; Dunn et al.
2012). Empirical bioethics sets out to use the empirical to enrich the ana-
lysts’ theoretical work as drawn from the field of moral philosophy; socio-
logical work on ethics tends to focus on (and to varying degrees advocate)
those carrying out practices (the actors), and not analysts, as the proper site
of ethical judgment (Hedgecoe 2004; Wainwright et al. 2006; Cribb et al.
2008). My account differs from empirical ethics in that I am not directly
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trying to improve the application of existing moral principles or frame-
works. However, I also seek to address a problem, which I see in socio-
logical and science and technology studies (STS) accounts of ethics, where
ethics is somehow found in actors’ discourse and practices without an
accompanying account of the ethical on the part of the analyst, which might
be examined and critiqued. Moreover, I see the claim that ethics only exists
where it is being enacted or ‘‘deployed’’ as a barrier to the analyst having
any ethical input. It may be that this is just a difference of opinion about
how much to foreground the empirical, but as I will argue throughout the
article this has important implications for when we as analysts try to discuss
ethics.
Despite the differences between the approach I am advocating and ANT,
ANT has provided invaluable tools for the analyst working with the empiri-
cal. One of these has been the highlighting of ontological ambiguity, as this
suggests that ‘‘the real’’ is not fully present, which, I would argue, suggests
it is not and cannot be fully captured in our observations of the empirical
(Latour 2005; Law and Lien 2013; Law and Singleton 2005). This ontolo-
gical uncertainty is explored through notions of contingency as revealed by
‘‘controversy’’ (Latour 2005) and in ‘‘studies of practical ontologies’’ (Gad
and Bruun 2014). Therefore, while there are useful compatibilities between
my approach and that of ANT, there is an important difference in that ANT
(or ANT and its sympathizers) insists on ‘‘foregrounding practicalities
materialities, events’’ (Mol 2002, 12). As a direct result, a given disease,
for example, ‘‘becomes a part of what is done in practice’’ (Mol 2002, 12).
However, I propose an account that does not privilege the empirical. Here I
introduce the concept of ‘‘the virtual,’’ which suggests an alternative onto-
logical structure to that adhered to by ANT. The virtual is neither totally
abstract nor fully deployed or ‘‘actual,’’ and it can and does exert an influ-
ence, which is entirely real (Deleuze [1968] 1994). One example used to
capture the idea of something being both virtual and actual is in relation to a
gene, which ‘‘involves commanding several characteristics at once, and
acting only in relation to other genes; the whole constitutes a virtuality, a
potentiality’’ (Deleuze [1968] 1994, 234). The ethics I advance shares these
qualities of virtuality and potentiality.
On the one hand, my use of a Deleuzian ontology echoes the rejection by
ANT of an idealist position exemplified by Plato, for example, in which the
empirical provides us with mere imperfect representations of pure essences
or ideas. However, the virtual also works against the view that ‘‘the concrete
is attained when the inadequacy of an abstraction is compensated for by the
inadequacy of its opposite’’ (Deleuze [1968] 1994, 234). As ANT
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proponents would agree, a concept such as that of the gene, as with any
other concept that is encountered empirically, is affected by an openness or
indeterminacy. This is because it is linked with how the concept has been
applied or could be applied in the past and future. However, the problem for
ANT is that there is no possibility of gathering all these instances or appli-
cations together or making them present and thereby empirical (Patton
2000). Rather, some of them necessarily remain ‘‘elsewhere,’’ as Gad and
Bruun (2014) have suggested. What follows is an exploration of a series of
ethical moments, where interviewees describe conflicts regarding how to
proceed ethically. That ethical moments arise because the relationships to
elsewhere are not annulled (Delanda 2002, 75) is due to the influence of the
virtual, which, I argue, provides the ontological grounds for the analyst to
do ethics.
Doing Ethics on the Empirical
Some proponents of the comparatively new field of empirical ethics suggest
that knowing something of the circumstances in which a moral framework
will apply is a valid and useful way of working toward its ethical application
(Ives 2008; Ives and Draper 2009; Leget, Borry, and de Vries 2009). This
can be done through understanding more about the practices and the cir-
cumstances in which ethical problems arise and may, perhaps optimisti-
cally, frame empirical work as a way to ‘‘lay bare the experiences, motives
and intentions of those involved’’ (Leget, Borry, and de Vries 2009, 234).
The ‘‘relevance of actual behavior’’ is simply ‘‘inescapable’’ (Sen 2009,
67). To organize ‘‘encounters with experience’’ (Ives 2008), therefore,
appears to be a relevant preoccupation for the analyst interested in doing
ethics. However, combining ethics with the empirical has long been recog-
nized as an enterprise beset with conundrums, such as how and how far to
distinguish between facts and values, and the barriers to deriving a norma-
tive imperative from a description of a state of affairs, or an ‘‘ought’’ from
an ‘‘is’’ (Haimes and Williams 2007; Garrard and Wilkinson 2005; Ives and
Draper 2009). The enormous difficulty of aligning a perspective that aims
for universal solutions to ethical problems with one that aims at describing
the particularities of a set of practices and circumstances has been well
noted (Haimes and Williams 2007; Dunn et al. 2012). Unsurprisingly, the
search for new combinations of the ethical and the empirical to address
these problems continues (Dunn et al. 2012).
Empirical ethics enters a field equipped with a particular moral frame-
work with the objective, broadly speaking, of comparing the empirical
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against this framework. However, the very notion of having a preestab-
lished idea of what is ethical has drawn criticism from both the sociology
of bioethics and the STS communities who see this as standing outside
armed only with abstract principles, claiming an objectivity that nobody
can have (Mol 1999; Singleton 1996; Wainwright et al. 2006). However, for
analysts interested in engaging creatively with the ethical and the empirical,
empirical ethics offers some helpful insights. I am persuaded that my job as
an analyst is not to solve the actors’ controversies for them (Latour 2005).
Nevertheless, a claim to recognize an ethical controversy, on the part of
myself as an analyst, does I think require some sort of worked out system
for describing how I process the ethical. Haimes (2002) has rightly pointed
out that the relationships a person has with others will determine the extent
to which a moral concept like autonomy coincides with her experience. Yet
such a stance on the empirical enactment of autonomy rests upon an
assumption that the analyst can distinguish between autonomy as described
or observed and autonomy as it could or should be. At the empirical level, it
seems fair to say that the analyst himself or herself confronts the ethical as a
result of ‘‘situations in which, and by the extent to which, the moral is seen
to be problematic, contested, in need of deliberation, analysis, or critique’’
(Parker 2007, 2255). It is this combination of the moral, the ethical, and the
empirical that allows a distinction to be made between principles and fra-
meworks (the moral) and a simultaneous recognition of and distancing from
these frameworks in response to conflict (the ethical) Parker (2007). The
ethical could be seen then as a potentiality (or a virtuality) not captured by
an instance of the moral and the empirical.
Ethicists and Actors
A more sociological distinction has also been made between what ‘‘princi-
ples and other normative frameworks suggest ought to be done’’ and what
actors themselves feel to be correct or ‘‘deemed socially acceptable, good or
right’’ (Wainwright et al. 2006, 734). In this socially grounded account of
ethics, it is actors who distinguish the normative or the moral from the
ethical, being aware of principles but using their own judgment in relation
to their practices. Pickersgill (2012, 582) argues for the influence of a
‘‘regime of normativity,’’ which, he claims, provides conditions for both
the production and questioning of ethical discourse. However, practice
remains in the foreground via the claim that it is through practice that
attempts are made by actors to ‘‘reinsert care into research’’ (Pickersgill
2013, 38). Moreover, the choice to foreground practice does not in itself
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answer the question of what makes the analyst think they are seeing ethical
practices. Barnes (2001) suggests something extrapractical is needed for
explanations based on practices to make sense (see also Gad and Bruun
2014). In the case of ethics, an analyst finds or recognizes something in the
practices or discourses of informants, which is ethical but not normative.
Moreover, a practice-based account ostensibly enables an analyst to avoid
any appeal to normative or moral frameworks by describing actors’ ethical
or care activities as being embedded or coproduced. However, foreground-
ing empirically observable practices in order to avoid charges such as
essentialism, delusions of objectivity, or idealism, itself has been critiqued
as foundationalist and reductionist (Turner cited in Gad and Bruun 2014;
Delanda 2006).
Ethics in Practice
Beyond a simple foregrounding of practices, a rejection of the role of the
professional bioethicist in the production of ethical practices also appears in
some sociological and STS accounts (Hedgecoe 2004; Mol 2008). The task
of doing ethics properly falls to those actors involved in decisions around
‘‘every day,’’ ‘‘local’’ practices (Cribb et al. 2008; Pickersgill 2012; Haimes
2002; Hedgecoe 2004). Actors appear as ‘‘the genuine applied philoso-
phers, working through a moral dilemma, using values and beliefs about
morality to reach a decision that they then have to put into practice’’
(Hedgecoe 2004, 137). Those involved in practice (the actors) are those
who decide which of their values apply best in a given situation. Mol asserts
that in relation to the care of people with diabetes, ‘‘the crucial moral act is
not making value judgments, but engaging in practical activities’’ (2008,
75). Capturing these ethically infused statements and actions of the actors is
what provides the analysts with a ‘‘socially embedded ethics’’ (Cribb et al.
2008, 351). This has been contrasted with ‘‘a position of abstract rational-
ity’’ rooted in a philosophical tradition (Wainwright et al. 2006, 745). This
ethics in practice perspective is often accompanied by a more or less expli-
cit suggestion that analysts ought to avoid doing ethics. Singleton, for
example, talks about a ‘‘guilt-inducing discourse of should, which seems
to be based in a discourse of oppression and domination’’ (1996, 462).
Although Singleton is addressing a specific case, the way her conclusions
were framed suggests that the term ‘‘should’’ lends itself to oppression and
domination. Some have argued that revealing contingencies and contradic-
tions, as STS does, is itself political and this makes explicit ethical engage-
ment on the part of the analyst unnecessary (Gad and Bruun 2014). While
6 Science, Technology, & Human Values
 at The University of Edinburgh on June 2, 2016sth.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
this claim may be true in some cases, claims that ethics are simply found in
practice and reducible thereto removes the grounds for the analyst to sug-
gest alternatives.
Ontologies of ANT
Mol argues that ‘‘reality does not precede the mundane practices in which
we interact with it’’ (1999, 75). ANT has stressed the analytical usefulness
of the ontologically uncertain or problematic: something such as a disease
can be in many places at the same time but changes in significant ways as it
enters into configurations with different discourses, people, technologies,
and practices (Mol and Law 1994; Mol 2002; Law and Singleton 2005).
ANT has given us the ‘‘fire object’’ which encapsulates ‘‘sets of present
dynamics generated in, and generative of, realities that are necessarily
absent’’ (Law and Singleton 2005, 343). However, a protocol, which is
intended as a universal guide to behavior, ‘‘rests on real time work’’ (Tim-
mermans and Berg 1997, 275). What happens is determined in the local
context by the institutional, the infrastructural, and the material. Therefore,
the virtual has no role in this account of ‘‘local universalism’’ (Timmermans
and Berg 1997). This renders rhetorical a question such as that raised by
Mol regarding practices of ‘‘care’’: ‘‘they deserve to be able to travel but
how?’’ (2008, 87). How can we respond to something deserving to travel or
indeed the call for STS to do more than debunk (Latour 2004), if the analyst
can only engage with what is already ‘‘completely deployed in their rela-
tions with the world’’ (Harmon 2009, 18)?
Controversy and Ethics
Latour states that ‘‘there is no rear-world behind to be used as a judge of this
one’’ (2005, 118). Latour’s early rejection of an idealist position is evident
in statements such as ‘‘There is no pre-established harmony’’ (1988, 164),
from where he moves to the statement that ‘‘How something holds together
is determined on the field of battle’’ (1988, 164). Despite ANT’s interest in
controversy, the reluctance to engage with ethics is arguably bound up with
the ontological position that there is nothing but that which is somehow
deployed. There may be no preestablished harmony or at least not one that
provides us with any useful epistemological tool or moral framework.
However, it does not follow that which is is only that which is deployed
or actual. The ontological controversies that interest me are not only about
scientists’ claims about what is, they are also about what should be. The
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virtual creates conditions for actual experience, not as a preestablished
harmony but as ‘‘a changing series of relations’’ (Williams 2013, 9), that
disrupts and troubles the actual. Therefore, while Latour’s (2005) advice
about being attentive to controversies is not intended to be applied thus, it is
potentially productive for analysts who hope to engage with both ethics and
the empirical. It is ‘‘a way in’’ for the analyst to consider not only questions
such as ‘‘Why is this problematic?’’ but also ‘‘What would you do differ-
ently?’’ As Fraser points out, it is in ‘‘recognising the role that social
scientists play in creating the worlds they seek to investigate and . . .
wishing to change worlds that include more than social scientists and their
objects alone––that the concept of the virtual is of value’’ (2010, 77).
Ontology and Ethics
Terms like ‘‘regime of normativity’’ (see Pickersgill 2013, 582) show the
difficulty of capturing the conditions for the ethical by reference to actual
practices alone. A regime of normativity has ‘‘a part to play in the struc-
turing of everyday work’’ (Pickersgill 2013, 582), but it is not fully
expressed in or reducible to practice. Nor is it entirely findable in a
particular material object like, for example, a written set of normative
guidelines. Practices and objects gain significance due to their being
‘‘irremediably entangled with discourses and histories produced in other
places––elsewhere’’ (Gad and Bruun 2014, 11). This elsewhere disrupts
and challenges the actual but is not a transcendental fixed moral state to
which the actual provides a poor comparison. ‘‘Morality . . . is the system
of judgement. But ethics overthrows the system of judgement’’ (Deleuze
1988 in Bryant 2012, 33). Therefore, while the ‘‘moral’’ attempts to
impose a fixed external standard, ethics is a creative and transformative
process, the means of bringing about something new (Buchanan 2011).
What is normative in Deleuzian ethics, therefore, is the ability to critique,
transform, and create (Jun 2011). ANT gives us the fire object, but what
about its inverse––the absent dynamics––that are generative of realities
that are present? Such dynamics are an important part of an ethical
moment.
Interviewing on Data Sharing Practices and Ethics
As part of a project on the governance of biobanks, I carried out forty-nine
semistructured research interviews between 2006 and 2009, with individ-
uals involved in the management of ‘‘genetic databases’’ (or ‘‘biobanks’’)
8 Science, Technology, & Human Values
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in the UK. The biobanks in this project included a variety of organiza-
tional forms, from small tissue and sample collections, to repositories
destined to serve the research community, to genomic data sets. People
working in a range of capacities were interviewed. While the majority of
interviewees were directly involved in research in a full- or part-time
capacity, nine interviewees were primarily occupied with the facilitation
of research for the wider scientific community. Twenty-one interviewees
had a clinical role at some time as well as being active in research. The
project team drew up an interview schedule. All interviewees were asked
in the first instance both about their professional background and about
how they had collected the samples and data with which they were work-
ing. They were then asked more detailed questions about governance,
storage, and the sharing of data (see Appendix). A professional transcriber
transcribed the interviews verbatim. A set of codes were devised by the
author with the intent to draw out the interviewees’ statements about their
ethical and moral reflections on the data sharing and collaborative aspects
of their work. These data were coded using Nvivo 7. My aim here is to
provide examples of controversy arising in the context of data sharing or
changes in access to data. The focus will be on how interviewees talk
about challenges and relate these to what they see as ethical requirements
and normative frameworks.
Data sharing via biobanks and collaborations is necessarily a geogra-
phically dispersed activity, and, in some cases, only a part of what the
interviewees were doing locally. In many cases, there were not yet reg-
ularities of behavior or routine (Rouse 2001). As we shall see below in
what the actors say about practices, ‘‘what past and present practice is
includes its possible futures, which have not yet been fully determined’’
(Rouse 2001, 197). Data sharing in the majority of the examples I give
below posed a challenge to what people had been doing or prompted
discussion about what they would like to do. I am interested in the dis-
courses interviewees employ and create, and I use the interview data to
consider what they think ought to be considered in relation to what is and
is not ethical in terms of practice. Therefore, interviewees appear not only
as ‘‘practicing actors’’ but also as ‘‘thinkers’’ who relate their desires for
their own practices with the wider normative, scientific, and social impli-
cations of what they do (Gad and Bruun 2014). One of the questions of
interest was how to understand what was ethical, when new forms of
interaction and new relationships were being constructed within a new
assemblage. I do not attempt to distinguish between the real ethical posi-
tion and interests of the interviewees.
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Ethics and Governance: Controversies and Practices
As discussed, the normative, understood as a formal and external frame-
work, has been contrasted with what actors see as being ‘‘socially accep-
table, good or right’’ (Wainwright et al. 2006, 734). The following examples
are cases where this distinction appears to be born out as interviewees
contrast their own ethical vision with a rigid governance structure that does
not allow responsiveness to what is really ethically important about prac-
tice. The following interviewee was a clinical neurologist as well as a
research scientist. As part of a dialogue on obtaining consent for patients
to be involved in research, the interviewee repeated the theme of frustration
with the ethics committees’.1
Well, I had a conversation with that patient where it was quite clear to me
they wanted me to look for the cause of their disease so I should carry on
looking. Should I ask the ethics committee every time I want to screen a
gene? (Interview 14, Clinician/Researcher)
The interviewee evoked a relationship between patient and doctor in
order to argue for the ethics of research. This relationship is used by the
interviewee to argue that what is at issue ethically is not what the ethics
committee focuses on. The conflict between the ethics committee and
the interviewee is an ontological one at the same time, as it is a con-
troversy about the ethical meaning of testing new genes in connection
with a disease. The interviewee claimed that tests of different mutations
were really different instances of the same thing, namely, the search for
the genetic mutations implicated in the disease affecting his patients. In
this context, therefore, screenings for different genes are both ontolo-
gically and ethically the same. Therefore, for the interviewee, the ethics
committee is wrong to see each screening for a new gene as ontologi-
cally and ethically separate. In this regard, the relationship with the
patient, and the conversation with this patient, is presented by the inter-
viewee as having more authentic ethical authority. A perceived inability
to grasp ethically important ontological distinctions also prompted the
clinician in the next excerpt to complain that Local Research Ethics
Committees (LRECs) had impeded access to National Health Service
(NHS) data, which had in turn impeded his research. LRECs are criti-
cized for being remote––both in a geographical and in an ethical
sense––to the patients and data subjects, who he evokes as being sym-
pathetic to his aims.
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Research ethics committees that haven’t got a clue about the ethics that
people in their council estate where I’ve been this morning in [area], care
about. (Interviewee 41, Clinician/Researcher)
On the face of it, this supports the STS and sociological understandings
of ethics that the scientist sees what is ethically important due to being
embedded in practice. These interviewees challenge the moral authority
of the ethics committee by drawing on what patients or patients’ commu-
nities wanted. Another interviewee claimed, his research had been ‘‘held up
by the unethical nature of ethical [sic] committees’’ (Interview 44, Clini-
cian/Researcher), because there were local approaches to assessing research
access to NHS patients. The challenge to the moral authority of LRECs is
prompted by the limits placed upon the interviewees’ research opportunities
but also by differing ontological and ethical stances. The interviewees
themselves present a picture of their own embeddedness in practice as
conferring authority on them to make ethical claims. However, the practices
the interviewees refer to aren’t precisely actual practices, but rather poten-
tial practices that are dependent on taking a different position than that
which ethics committees take. While these examples on one level support
the dichotomy between an ethics in practice and abstract normative frame-
works, they also challenge the notion that practitioners’ ethics are
embedded in practice.
Negotiating the Ethical
Biobanks are in many cases repositories, that is, institutions that store data
in order to facilitate access to a broad range of potential users. For many of
the interviewees, these were fairly new configurations of the material, the
professional, and the organizational, and they were full of ontological con-
troversies that were at the same time ethical controversies. One explanation
given for this was that actors coming into a biobank were from different
professional disciplines. In the case of one set of information technology
(IT) professionals, a practice taken for granted by them became an ethical
challenge, which confronted not only their understanding of what they were
doing but also that of the scientists and the ethics committee. Creating
‘‘backups’’ entails ensuring that data sets are copied, so that damage to the
original will not entail loss of the data. The ethics committee and scientists
wanted to allow individual participants to withdraw from the study and for
this promise of withdrawal to form part of the informed consent process.
However, for the IT professionals,2 the practice of ‘‘backing up’’ was at
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odds with the promise of withdrawal, as the individual’s contribution to the
data would still be included in the backup copies of the data set. Below is an
example of how they responded to being asked how they had negotiated
with other groups involved in creating the biobank.
We talked through the principle of physically how do you deal with with-
drawal of consent in that back up environment . . . . But now we’re into okay
but we agreed when a restore was done that people who had withdrawn
consent their data would be destroyed, now we’re into a debate about what
it is destruction. (Interview 40, IT Professional)
This conflict led the IT professionals to suggest that their role had been
understood as purely technical and operational. As they put it, they were the
‘‘Cinderella section.’’ However, the withdrawal and backup problems made
it clear to them that ‘‘the science community hasn’t got the basic under-
standing of IT and the implications of it’’ (Interview 40, IT Professional).
This situation is difficult to attribute to an opposition between a rigid
normative framework and what the scientist sees as ‘‘good.’’ An external
normative framework, which could be contrasted with one relatively more
internal to the scientists and their practices, did not yet exist. In important
ways, the scientists were aligned with the ethics committee, who were
feeling their way in this new assemblage, along with a variety of other
actors (including epidemiologists and clinicians) and actants (such as the
backup files). This interesting coming together was best revealed by attend-
ing to what the disagreement was about (Latour 2005). Moreover, attending
to this disagreement opens the door for the analyst to consider what the
ethical alternatives could be in this dilemma—just as the actors are doing. It
is interesting that the IT professionals wanted to shed their Cinderella status,
as they perceived it but it is also interesting to see how this discussion about
withdrawal and backups impacted the discussion on ethics (see Laurie
2011). The story prompts the analyst to recognize that ethics cannot be
reduced to a rigid normative framework or to practices. This challenging
event or controversy does not highlight a dichotomy but rather raises many
ethical possibilities—for actors and analysts, it ‘‘presupposes a swarm of
differences’’ (Deleuze [1968] 1994, 61).
Ethics and the Enrollment of Governance
Ethics or other forms of ‘‘non-science’’ can maintain an image of science in
a way that may even ‘‘deprivilege’’ science (Wainwright et al. 2006, 773).
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ANT might alternatively see this as a drive to enroll ethical frameworks
(Callon 1986). In the example below, an epidemiologist is comforted by the
fact that the chairman of an LREC agreed that it is ethical to perform a
meta-analysis on available data.3 This agreement arose due to the LREC
chairman being willing to hold informal discussions with the interviewee in
relation to a particular ethical issue that of ‘‘pooling’’ data from different
existing clinical trials.
So we’ve asked the ethics chairman before whether they think there’s a need
for ethics approval for that sort of project. And I’m not the only person doing
this sort of work––it’s international and the general feeling is no because the
meta-analysis, the pooling of these data is about answering the same question
as the data we originally collected for in these individual studies, it’s just
answering it with more precision because you’ve got more data. (Interview
18, Epidemiologist)
The LREC chairman was enrolled alongside the ‘‘general feeling’’
among a scientific research community to constitute the practices as ethical.
However, the interviewee also described an alternative scenario, where
DNA is studied irrespective of its connection to a particular disease as
requiring more formal ethics committee scrutiny.
But if they’re looking at different questions to the ones that we were asking
then I might be concerned that they actually need ethical [sic] committee
approval because we’ve never, for example looking at the DNA in its own
right for a different genetic mutation has got nothing to do with the condition
we were looking at. (Interview 18, Epidemiologist)
This is arguably an instance of ethical boundary work (Wainwright et al.
2006; see also Gieryn 1983) or enrollment of actors based in ethics. There
are two interesting points to make based on the position this interviewee
takes. On the one hand, there is again a difficulty in separating a rigid
external ethics from what the interviewee does in practice herself. On the
other, while she is describing ethics as something being constructed by a set
of actors, she resists the idea that another set of practices could find a similar
route to being thought of as ethical. Rather, her claim suggests there is a
notion of the ethical that individuals should not take for granted even in the
face of a possible consensus about how to act. In the example above, the
alternative scientific proposal she considers would need to face formal
ethical scrutiny. This again suggests that there is something about the
Heeney 13
 at The University of Edinburgh on June 2, 2016sth.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
ethical that is more than just the point scoring instrumentalism of boundary
work. So even enrollment of the ethics committee chairman and other
scientists, as described in the case of pooling data, does not for the inter-
viewee in itself make something ethical.
Consent and Practice
The practice of gaining informed consent in order to embody the abstract
principle of autonomy (Faden and Beauchamp 1986) was pervasive in
activities around biobanks. However, as we have seen already in some of
the examples above, data are often mediated by the relationships research-
ers have with patients and their families through their clinics. So one clin-
ician, who worked on rare genetic mutations involved in heart disease,
stated that consent allowed him and his team to operate ‘‘fairly freely.’’
He also noted that families have less interest in the ‘‘niceties of consent and
privacy and data coordination’’ (Interview 12, Clinician/Researcher) than in
progress in explaining their condition. This relationship to consent can be
understood in the context of the clinician’s experience and familiarity with
the families whose data he and his team were analyzing. In many of the new
biobank scenarios, the clinician working with families will no longer be
directly involved when other researchers use the data. Thus, the link
between the patient and the clinician is an absent dynamic (see Law and
Singleton 2005). Indeed, for the data subject, the loss of the link with the
clinician means that informed consent also has the function of a decree
absolute, effectively divorcing (and excluding) them from further input in
the research process.
This function of consent could be seen where the data were to be held in a
repository and the original collector, and, indeed, their connections with the
data subjects were to be ‘‘effaced’’ (Lee and Stenner 1999). Yet absent
dynamics in many cases do not fully submit to this process of effacement and
instead appear as ethical considerations. The next interviewee, who has much
experience working with large repositories of data from different nonhuman
organisms, talks about the problems of privacy and anonymity. The challenges
to keeping practices ethical, according to the justifications the interviewee is
familiarwith, arise due to the introductionofhumandata subjects. These issues
remain defiantly present in the face of the positivemessages about the benefits
of open access for genomics research (Heeney et al. 2010).
And the experience in genomics again and again is that datasets are valuable
when they’re aggregated together and . . . when people have the freedom to
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think about any sensible obviously ethical in this case, I mean any sensible
use of that data. (Interviewee 10, Bioinformatician)
Due to the interviewee’s belief in the scientific value of open access, he
describes having dismissed resistance from clinical colleagues as being
instrumental, a mere matter of protecting one’s own research territory.
However, the interviewee finds that the ethical issues raised on occasion
by clinicians and other scientists (who are often the original collectors of
the data) cannot be canceled out either with claims of scientific protec-
tionism or by recourse to informed consent. The interviewee claimed that
despite his best efforts to reduce them to self-interest on the part of sci-
entific and clinical colleagues, the tensions between the benefits of open
access and the ethical issues persisted in causing him an ‘‘annoying
headache.’’
Consent and Uncanceled Dynamics
Attempts to employ informed consent as a tool to future-proof uses of the
data against ethical challenges was a recurring theme. Yet ethical uncer-
tainties remained, as in the example above. The following interviewee was a
repository-based IT professional who admitted that using a broad consent to
free the data for a wide variety of uses failed to capture fully some ethically
important aspects of the data. The interviewee claimed that this was due to
the fact that data had been generated for other purposes by other users in
other settings. In other words, the data had come from elsewhere.
And have they been obtained in the same manner with the same donor
consent, in the same spirit that we do that here and if so how could we
guarantee it and how could we then you know go on to pass it on to and be
responsible in a sense for its quality when it goes further down the line to
researchers? (Interview 35, IT Professional)
In addition to the new repository style biobanks created from scratch,
some repositories subsume data from existing studies and allow them to be
used by the research community, broadly defined. This happened with
several cohort studies, which in some cases housed data collected over the
life course of a group of individuals. The integration of such studies within
new repository assemblages involved confrontation between different sets
of practices and discourses, as we have seen above. One interviewee
described the evolution of the cohort study, which he had been heavily
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involved in maintaining, into a resource to be used in a repository-type
setting. Here, he describes his discussions with his local ethics committees
about this process.
Then we had to discuss the arrangements for the future and . . . that’s an area
which is very important it seems to me is having got ethical approval for the
original field study, it doesn’t necessarily mean you’ve got ethics approval for
every possible use of the biological material. (Interview 15, Clinician/
researcher)
Increasingly, data sharing involved the practice of making data open
access via a repository. Yet, as with informed consent above, the intervie-
wee felt that ethics committee approval did not capture the modes of access
in a ‘‘large biobank,’’ wherein data would be openly available for a variety
of research uses by a variety of users. The interviewee suggested that parts
of the normative or governance framework were being challenged by these
developments and competing drives rooted in different ontological visions
of the data resource.
I think the real tension that is arising is between a model which is built around
the . . . free and potent sharing of genetic sequence data and a model which is
much more rooted in the clinical trials and long term follow up studies.
(Interview 15, Clinician/Researcher)
This ethical tension related again to an ontological disagreement
about what the data were. It was also intimately connected to the inter-
viewee’s diminishing role as a gatekeeper, which he explicitly referred
to elsewhere in the interview. The ontological status of the data is not
settled, connected as it is to some of those involved in an ‘‘original field
of study.’’
An interviewee who described himself as someone who was brought in
‘‘to make sure the computers worked’’ (Interview 30, IT consultant) had a
role in managing data storage and access for a variety of projects within one
institution. The following is part of an anecdote employed as an example of
the type of governance problems he had confronted in this role. The story
related to a collaborating organization that wanted to use the data to study a
disease but also to link back to particular individuals in order to invite them
to participate in a targeted piece of research. The interviewee again felt that
there were expectations about participation that were not matched by this
particular use of the data.
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Yes I think that was definitely a sort of ethical moment because they were
saying, well you know you’re not going to get your funding if you don’t do
this and we were saying yes, yes. So it’s quite a, and the lack of, the lack of
any I mean obviously there’s no law on that. (Interview 30, IT Consultant)
This challenging event arose from a confrontation between different
understandings of what was ethical in relation to the use of the data.
Again, the interviewee’s position was influenced by an earlier situation
or absent dynamic. The interviewee said that when participants in the
study were recruited, they ‘‘weren’t signed up to be approached’’ in this
way. The ethical moment evoked by this interviewee, in common with the
tensions noted by the interviewees quoted above, is a conflict in which
existing guidance does not adequately capture what is happening. More-
over, an ethical solution does not present itself to the interviewees due to
their being embedded in practice. This suggests that the ethical is an idea
or a goal, reducible neither to practice nor to a given moral framework.
Rather, it is a creative response to the sorts of dilemmas with which the
interviewees grapple.
Discussion
With the concept of the ethical moment, I have challenged a dichotomous
view of ethics as either practices or guidelines. The ethical moment was an
actors’ category that captured the struggle to bring ideas of the ethical
together with unfolding practices. The ethical moment is an event whose
significance I have explored in terms of both ethics and ontology. I have
argued that ethics partakes of the virtual and, therefore, is not something
fixed or universal but a changing series of relations, which challenges both
fixed ideals and actual practices (Williams 2013). A new data sharing
arrangement may employ informed consent to settle differences or to avoid
conflicts, yet controversy remains, tensions are not canceled (Delanda
2002). These tensions are visible, where actors engage in ‘‘deliberation,
analysis, or critique’’ (Parker 2007). Following the advice of ANT, I have
been attentive to controversies where actors challenged normative frame-
works or voiced concern that something was missing from them. The con-
troversies, which often involve moral language to defend or criticize a
position, were an opportunity to consider the ethical issues raised by, and
therefore of relevance to, the actors. These erupting tensions, which are the
source of controversy and disagreement, happen despite the many concrete
attempts to construct and fix practice as ethical. Equally, they were a ‘‘way
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in’’ for me, the analyst, enabling me to be aware of and engage with these
issues. Therefore, my perspective, while not the same as those of the actors,
cannot be dismissed as coming from a fixed abstract framework untroubled
by empirical insights.
Attempts to circumvent or remove existing ‘‘gatekeepers’’ or ‘‘obli-
gatory passage points’’ had been particularly contentious for many of
the interviewees. Local disagreements about ontology and ethics con-
tinued despite the use of informed consent to cement new configurations
of the ethical and the material. These disagreements are reminders of
the gatekeepers and the relationships to elsewhere that they evoke (see
Gad and Bruun 2014). I focused particularly on the approval of ethics
committees and the obtaining of informed consent, as examples of
moral or normative mechanisms. Informed consent is an issue that has
been alive for many years in the research community, but it continually
shifts with its role in new assemblages. Consent is seen as necessary to
release the data to the repository because, as Star and Griesemer (1989)
note, repositories remove the need for negotiating new uses for the
resource with the original collectors (or research participants). The
signed informed consent form is thus intended to be part of a ‘‘stan-
dardized package’’ (Fujimura 1992), which comes along with the data
and fixes subsequent uses as ethical, thus canceling disagreements in
advance. Yet the controversies the actors themselves talked about indi-
cate an ‘‘overstretching’’ of informed consent (Corrigan 2004), which
links to debates in bioethics around broad informed consent as an
attempt to make future and unknown practices ethical (Hofman 2009;
Sheehan 2011). In the examples above, the informed consent and ethics
committees played a complex role, which cannot be reduced to an
abstract moral framework external to practice.
Work within STS and medical sociology has promoted a resistance to
defining what is ethical in favor of studying both how ethics are constituted
in practice and, perhaps, what is at stake for those involved (Wainwright
et al. 2006; Cribb et al. 2008; Pickersgill 2012; Hedgecoe 2004; Singleton
1996). Yet I propose that how we define actual ethical practices remains
problematic. The distinction between normative frameworks and what
scientists themselves saw as morally good or right (Wainwright et al.
2006) was conceptually useful, and, indeed, the interviewees engaged with
prevailing moral or governance frameworks when describing their ethical
dilemmas. Emphasizing the incompatibility or inadequacy of ethical guide-
lines, governance, and practices was often an interviewee’s way of articu-
lating a desire for change or highlighting a lack of continuity. Moreover,
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work within ANT and the sociology of bioethics demonstrates that partic-
ular moral or governance tools are enacted in networks by particular con-
figurations of patients, scientists, physicians, technologies, and artifacts
(Timmermans and Berg 1997). However, as an analyst, I have found the
distinction between the moral and the ethical as constituted by conflict to be
more useful in enabling me to engage with ethics. Attending to controversy
helps me demonstrate that ethics are not always embedded for the actors
themselves. Rather, interviewees challenged and disagreed with current
states of affairs by evoking connections to an idealized past or future or
some other variety of elsewhere.
ANT approaches foreground ontological uncertainty through the
empirical, compellingly arriving at the sorts of observations made by
Law and Singleton (2005). The difference between that approach and
the one I am suggesting here is perhaps a matter of degree in terms of
engagement with the ontologically uncertain, or as I have suggested,
foregrounding of the empirical. I have broadly agreed that any ethics
that takes the empirical seriously should be more than the application of
principles in particular settings. Still, the ethical, as I have tried to
describe it, can be the province of the analyst at least as well as the
actor. As I have attempted to demonstrate with my empirical examples,
when engaging with the ethical the analyst and actor are equal in that
they cannot rely entirely on what is immediately deployed, enacted, or
actual. The reason for this is that in no situation in which ethical con-
siderations arise is the ‘‘relation of cause and effect between actual
things . . . a sufficient explanation’’ (Williams 2013, 56). There are at
least two important implications of this for the argument I have
advanced here. First, the actual––whether accessed through experiences
or practices––is necessary but not sufficient for engagement with ethics.
Second, insistence on a one-dimensional ontology––or a ‘‘deliberate
actualism’’ (Harmon 2009)––creates an asymmetry between analyst and
actor, excluding the latter from engaging in ethics.
Ethical moments we encounter in our empirical work confront both actor
and analyst with ‘‘irresolvable problems that demand to be renewed rather
than solved as classified and predictable’’ (Williams 2013, 183). This
implies that, to paraphrase Fraser (2006), the analyst should be free to
explore unrealized ethical potentialities. As we have seen, actors draw on
ethical potentialities to argue that things need not be as they are but rather
could and should be different. I have argued throughout for the removal of
ontological barriers to analysts doing what is essentially the same thing:
engaging with ethics.
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Bringing together controversy and ethics, I have proposed a nonreduc-
tive and reflexive account of ethics in practice. My reading of the empirical
data presented above supports an ontological structure comprising the vir-
tual and the actual, which draws upon the strengths of ANT and sociology
of bioethics in dealing with the empirical. These strengths include seeing
controversy as providing useful insights in its own right and not simply as
providing a focus for the problem-solving frameworks of moral philosophy.
This is a case study of how to think ‘‘with Latour’’ (Lee and Stenner 1999)
and other ANT proponents, and with the philosophy of Deleuze, about
engagement with ethics and the empirical. I have run concepts together
with data with the aim of creating a ‘‘conceptual hybridity’’ (Jenson
2014) that allows me to take both ethics and the empirical seriously. The
interviewees raised questions of ethical interest, and the role of the analyst
could be to propose ways in which to engage with the confrontations that
the methods of STS open up to consideration. Ontologically, the actor
network theorists leave the door open. My aim has been to venture through
the door in relation to ethics in order to think of ethics neither as given in
practices nor as fixed, eternal, and objective. In the ethics I am proposing,
‘‘there is neither certainty nor respite at any point’’ (Jun 2011, 104).
Appendix
Governing Genetic Databases—Topic Guide
Descriptive/factual information
About the interviewee
1. What is your professional background?
2. What is your function?
3. What kinds of samples/data are collected?
4. How did/do you obtain them?
 On what basis?
1. How big is the collection of samples/data?
2. For what purposes was the database designed?
3. Where does the funding for the project come from?
4. What do you call you collection of samples/data?
 Would you call your collection of samples/data a ‘‘genetic
database’’?
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Insight into how GDBs are run
General
1. Professional Background
2. What are the origins of the database (who set it up and why)
3. Who besides the interviewee is involved in the management,
design and use of the ‘‘GDB’’?
4. How is the database used on a day-to-day basis?
5. What (if anything) has changed since the beginning of the
project?
6. Which factors have most influence on practice?
Governance
1. Who is generally responsible for day-to-day management (what-
ever this means)?
2. What security measures are in place for the database?
3. Who can/could access the data?
4. How are decisions made about who accesses the data? (third
parties)
5. Are there rules governing the design of genetic databases?
6. What is the consent process for inclusion in the study/database?
7. What are the main codes, laws, and guidelines governing
practice?
 How has awareness of these affected practice?
1. Which official bodies are influential or relevant to practice?
2. At what stages have you thought about your responsibilities in
law?
Opinion about future governance
1. What will be the needs of users of genetic databases in the future
(say next ten years)?
2. What changes should be made to current guidance/governance
systems?
3. What would an appropriate set of guidelines/legal instruments
look like?
4. Would these alter with the type of database/collection/
information?
5. Do current rules and guidelines reflect the requirements of users
(or managers or others) of the database?
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6. What will be the future uses of this sort of the collection/database
you have built up?
7. Should data and biological samples be treated in a different way
by the law? (What about extracted DNA or proteins?)
General
1. Description of a ‘‘GDB’’
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Notes
1. Research ethics committees refer mostly to the Local Research Ethics Commit-
tees (LRECs), based in different National Health Service regions and tasked with
approving research. The process of gaining ethics approval through LREC
involved submitting the details of the proposed research, which would then be
reviewed by the committee; the professional and lay memberships of these
entities could vary. These processes were carried out under the auspices of the
Central Office for Research Ethics Committees, now the Health Research
Authority.
2. The interview was conducted with the leaders of the information technology
team on the project at the same time due to their time constraints.
3. A meta-analysis involves looking across studies using statistical techniques to
combine results.
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